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For a number of years scholars and policy makers have discussed
the merits and dangers of imposing liability for environmental dam-
age on banks lending to hazardous industries.1 Moves to make banks
vicariously liable for the environmental behavior of their borrowers
began in the United States in the search for deep pockets to fund the
enormous costs associated with environmental cleanups demanded by
government authorities. While lender liability may encourage more
environmentally sensitive lending, it has been shown that various
economic inefficiencies may occur when banks are exposed to expan-
sive liabilities in relation to the developments they fund.2 Among
other institutions in the financial services sector, harnessing insurance
markets may provide a better means for promoting sustainable de-
velopment and funding environmental damage costs.
In a range of jurisdictions insurers have become increasingly
concerned about pollution liability risks.3 Insurance markets in theory
can enable effective allocation of environmental damage costs and
provide incentives to deter environmentally irresponsible behavior.
Some commentators also believe that the contribution of insurance to
these policy goals can be enhanced when environmental liability in-
* Faculty of Law, University of Manchester
1. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY FOR BANKS (Joseph J. Norton et al., eds., 1995);
Richard Hooley, Lender Liability for Environmental Damage, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 405 (2001);
David Sarokin & Jay Schulkin, Environmental Concerns and the Business of Banking, J. COM.
BANK LENDINGeb. 1991, at 6.
2. See, e.g., James H. Boyd & Daniel E. Ingberman, The Search for Deep Pockets: Is ‘Ex-
tended Liability’ Expensive Liability?, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 232, 255-56 (1997).
3. See POLLUTION LAW AND INSURANCE – A COMPARISON OF THE LEGAL REGIMES OF
EUROPEAN STATES AND THE USA (Anthony Fitzsimmons ed., 1997) (outlining the legal posi-
tions of numerous countries in regard to pollution liability); David Cohen, Historic Cover for
Environmental Liability in the United Kingdom, INT’L INS. L. REV., Feb. 1996, at 46.
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surance is compelled by the state.4 Indeed, in practice, to strengthen
their protection against liability claims, banks have increasingly de-
manded liability insurance as a condition of financing, creating in ef-
fect a mandatory insurance situation for borrowers engaged in envi-
ronmentally problematic activities.5 Banks are also increasingly
diversifying their business into insurance services, further stimulating
this trend.6
This Article evaluates the role of insurance markets in managing
environmental risks, and focuses on the question of whether envi-
ronmental liability insurance should be compulsory. A wide range of
environmental problems are addressed by insurance markets, includ-
ing industrial accidents, contaminated land problems, climate change-
induced damage and other natural disasters. Focusing on industrial
pollution liabilities, the Article aims to show how insurance can facili-
tate environmental care and compensation, and some advantages that
may accrue from mandating insurance in relation to certain environ-
mental risks.
II.  MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK THROUGH INSURANCE
A. The Economic and Environmental Roles of Insurance
Insurance functions to spread the economic consequences of in-
dividual events across many parties, and, thereby, reduce the poten-
tially catastrophic effects of unforeseen events on individuals by hav-
ing those consequences absorbed by a third-party (the insurer).
Insurance is in principle utility maximizing, as it enables risk-averse
parties to transfer their risks for a relatively small fee, and by so pro-
tecting parties from exposure to costly liability allows them to pursue
socially beneficial ventures.7 Where losses occur, society is said to
4. See, e.g., Peter Jost, Limited Liability and the Requirement to Purchase Insurance, 16
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 259, 270 (1996); Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege, Environmental Harm
and Financial Responsibility, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INSURANCE – ISSUES & PRAC. 220
(2000).
5. See Eugene R. Anderson & Jordan Stanzler, Insurance Coverage for Environmental
Cleanup, 72 J. COM. BANK LENDING, at 17 (June 1990); Eugene R. Anderson & Jordan Stan-
zler, Maybe You’re Not Really Naked: Existing Insurance Policies May Protect You Against En-
vironmental Liability, A.B.A. BANKING  J., Aug. 1991, at 24.
6. See Gunter Dufey, The Changing Role of Financial Intermediation in Europe, INT’L J.
BUS., Spring 1998, at 52.
7. Economic efficiency is enhanced if risks are allocated to those parties who are best able
to bear them. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
981 (2001) (arguing “well being is generally increased by the availability of insurance”).
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benefit through the indemnification for unexpected loss and the res-
toration of resources for productive purposes.8 By determining ex ante
the party that will intervene if an accident occurs, insurance also
promises reduced transaction costs for all involved.9 Besides these
economic functions, insurance may have environmental policy bene-
fits.10 Insurance can be construed as an instrument for reflexive style
regulation, providing a framework for communicating to economic
actors the nature and cost of environmental risks, and offering incen-
tives for firms to behave more carefully.11 Through the setting of pre-
miums and coverage conditions, insurance markets may induce im-
proved safety measures and offer effective protection against the
financial consequences of such accidents, which is particularly impor-
tant where the responsible party is impecunious.12
Generically, there are two basic types of insurance. One type
serves to compensate damage caused by the insured to other people
and property. Known as third-party liability insurance, it can also
serve to protect the injurer from excessive claims that could finan-
cially cripple their business. Under liability insurance the insurer be-
comes responsible for not only guaranteeing compensation for dam-
age, but also ensuring that sufficient incentives remain for parties to
take due care given that insureds are not subject to the full extent of
legal liabilities. Alternatively, there exists first-party or personal in-
surance, which aims to compensate for example the costs incurred by
the insured in remedying (historic or future) pollution on their own
site, including externally generated harms.
Typically, an insurance arrangement arises when a firm proposes
their risk to an insurer, who evaluates the risk and stipulates condi-
8. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW 15-17
(1991) (arguing that economic incentives drive the use of insurance by business).
9. See Goran Skogh, Mandatory Insurance: Transaction Costs Analysis of Insurance, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 521, 529 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest
eds., 2000).
10. See Anna Amarandos & Diana Strauss, Environmental Insurance as a Risk Manage-
ment Tool, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 88 (2000); Stephan Schmidheiny, Eco-efficiency and
Sustainable Development, RISK MGMT. July 1996, at 51(focusing on the relationship between
insurance markets and sustainable development).
11. On reflexive law techniques, see STATE, LAW, AND ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC
SYSTEMS: REGULATION AND AUTONOMY IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE (Gunther Teubner & Al-
berto Febbrajo eds., 1992); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV.
1227, 1268 (1995) (stating that “the reflexive aim is not to constrain or dictate behavior, but
rather to provide mechanisms or structures to increase the amount of self-reflection and social
communication concerning serious environmental issues”).
12. See James W. Broderick et al., Environmental Risk Management and the Role of Envi-
ronmental Insurance, ENVTL. QUALITY MGMT., Autumn 2000, at 4.
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tions to reduce the likelihood and scope of potential loss.13 Addition-
ally, the insurer’s policy will specify the price (premium), and any ex-
clusions and limitations on the amount to be paid in a claim (known
as “maximum possible loss”). Not all risks can be insured. Ideally, the
features of an insurable situation are: (i) the insurance contract is
economically feasible for the parties, in terms of the cost of insurance
relative to the potential loss; (ii) the prospective insurer is able to ac-
curately calculate the probability of the loss and the possible magni-
tude of the damage should the accident occur; (iii) there is a suffi-
ciently large number of insureds sharing a similar risk exposure
profile, so that the insurer can use past experience to predict accu-
rately the risk faced by any individual; (iv) the insurer is able to de-
termine the circumstances of the loss so as to decide if the loss was
within the terms of the insurance contract; and (v) only a small pro-
portion of the group should be exposed to the risk of a loss at any one
occasion so that the insurer is not prone to numerous hefty claims si-
multaneously.14
Environmental damage has emerged as an important risk issue to
insurance markets.15 The escalation of claims associated with natural
disasters and contaminated site repairs has driven insurers to scruti-
nize their policyholders according to standards often well beyond
government regulatory requirements. The environmental perform-
ance of prospective policyholders can be reflected through the avail-
ability of insurance and the cost of premiums. With suspect environ-
mental performers excluded from insurance or paying higher
premiums, the insurance market prima facie provides financial incen-
tives for improved corporate conduct.16 As a risk manager, insurance
companies can encourage loss reduction by requiring insureds to
adopt appropriate safety measures and by monitoring implementa-
tion efforts. Insurers may also be able to contribute to planning for
disaster mitigation; according to Knoepfel and others, insurers have
“the skills to provide the assessment, quantification and mapping of
risks, prompt disaster recovery, fraud control, avoidance of duplicate
13. See DENNIS S. HANSELL, INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE 153-156 (1996) (outlining the
basic elements of insurance contracts).
14. JAMES L. ATHEARN, ET AL., RISK AND INSURANCE 32-36 (6th ed. 1977) (describing
the attributes of a risk that is perfectly suited to insurance).
15. See Insurers can be Environmentalists, NAT’L UNDERWRITER: PROP. & CASUALTY
RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Nov. 8, 1993, at 26.
16. See STEPHEN SCHMIDHEINY, CHANGING COURSE: A GLOBAL BUSINESS
PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT  65 (1992).
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administration and the access to international resources.”17 Kehne ar-
gues that insurance also has an advantage over administrative regula-
tion in the context of dynamic new risks, such as associated with bio-
technologies, as insurers generally are able to make adjustments to
policies, conditions, and premiums more flexibly and efficiently than
administrators.18
B. Development of Pollution Insurance Markets
Following the extension of statutory environmental liabilities,
market demand for insurance against costly pollution risks has inten-
sified. It began in the early 1970s with the appearance of mass tort
suits in the United States for long-latency diseases, such as asbesto-
sis.19 During the 1980s and 1990s demand for pollution liability insur-
ance in the United States became more pressing in the wake of the
1980 Superfund legislation  which created obligations to cleanup con-
taminated land.20 Historically, pollution liabilities were encompassed
within general public liability policies (also known as “comprehensive
general liability” (CGL)). These policies aimed to provide insurance
against a person’s potential legal liability to a third-party, whether in
statute, contract, or tort, but did not cover intentional acts or omis-
sions.21 Pollution that is not intentional or expected is classified as
“accidental,” for which there are two categories in insurance policy—
“sudden and accidental” pollution, and “gradual” pollution where
there is delay between the polluting acts and the manifestation of
damage.22 Further, damage to the insured’s property, such as cleanup
of a contaminated site, is excluded and must be the subject of a sepa-
rate policy.
17. See, e.g., IVO KNOEPFEL, ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND BEYOND: POTENTIAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY (UNEP Insurance Initiative for the Environ-
ment) § 3.2 (June 10, 1999).
18. Jeffrey Kehne, Encouraging Safety through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Re-
sponsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 410-11 (1986).
19. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Medaglia & Peter A. von Mehren, Beyond Asbestos and Envi-
ronmental Litigation: Coverage Disputes in the Twenty-first Century, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 1023,
1024 (1998).
20. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 1980, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).  See also Robert N. Sayler & Adam M. Cole, The Mother of All
Battles: The Dispute over Insurance Coverage for Environmental Contamination in the United
States, 1 ENVTL. LIABILITY 29, 29-30 (1993).
21. See Hansell, supra note 13, at 15 (stating that typical contract damages arise by acci-
dent).
22. See Thomas C. Gilchrist, Note, Insurance Coverage for Pollution Liability in the United
States and the United Kingdom: Covering Troubled Waters, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 109,
121-40 (1991) (regarding differential treatment of gradual and sudden pollution).
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An important distinction in pollution insurance concerns the pe-
riod for making claims.23 An occurrence policy provides coverage for
liability arising out of damage that occurs during the policy period,
regardless of when a claim alleging liability is made. In contrast, a
claims-made policy only covers liability arising out of claims actually
made during the policy period.  There is often a delay between the
polluting incident and resulting claims; this is inherent in the nature of
“gradual” pollution, but it can also occur in relation to sudden pollu-
tion where the harm is not immediately obvious when the incident
happens (for example, a substance that escapes into the atmosphere
or water from a process is carcinogenic, and the symptoms do not ap-
pear in victims for many years). Given the delay between occurrence
and the resulting claims, an occurrence policy is more advantageous
to the insured, subject to uncertainty about the meaning of “occur-
rence.” With claims-made coverage, once the insurer perceives that
vast numbers of costly claims will be lodged in the approaching years
the insurer will recoil at underwriting next year’s policy.
Public liability policies traditionally were written on an occur-
rence basis, often providing coverage for all premises of the insured
without any form of environmental assessment.24 The first qualified
pollution exclusion was introduced in the 1973 revision of the stan-
dard form CGL policy in the United States, and was widely availed
until 1985.25 Mounting claims for historical pollution caused under-
writers to amend the CGL policy to exclude gradual pollution and to
limit coverage to sudden and accidental incidents on a claims-made
basis.26 Protracted litigation over the extent of the exclusion caused
many insurers to withdraw entirely from the pollution liability insur-
ance market, although this did not immunize them against drawn-out
pollution liabilities for historical gradual pollution.27
In the wake of seepage of United States claims into European in-
surance markets,28 insurers in Europe devoted increasing attention to
the problem of pollution risks. In the early 1990s the Association of
23. Kathy D. Bailey and William Gulledge, Using Environmental Insurance to Reduce En-
vironmental Liability, 11 NAT. RESOURCE & ENVT 26, 26-27 (1997).
24. See id.
25. ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 145.
26. See Eugene R. Anderson et al., Liability Insurance: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 49
BUS. L. 259, 264-65 (1993).
27. Joseph Tanega, Implications of Environmental Liability on the Insurance Industry, 8 J.
ENVTL. L. 115, 127 (1996).
28. See, e.g., John Jennings, U.S. Jury Hits London for $70M in Pollution Losses, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER: PROP. & CASUALTY RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., May 15, 1995, at 2.
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British Insurers (ABI) coordinated policy revisions by publishing a
recommended pollution exclusion clause and incorporating an aggre-
gate limit for pay-outs.29 In Italy, all pollution risks were excluded
from public liability policies for businesses by the late 1970s on the
advice of the National Insurance Association of Italy.30 Most insurers
have moved to claims-made policy coverage,31 although the legality of
this has been challenged in several jurisdictions. Pollution risks were
only systematically excluded from French CGL contracts from 1993,
but attempts to rewrite policies on a claims-made basis were nullified
by the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation), causing great
consternation among insurers.32 Similarly, efforts have been made to
restrict claims-made policies in Belgium and Spain.33 Some European
insurers have also sought to better manage pollution risks through the
creation of insurance pools, especially in Denmark, Italy, the Neth-
erlands and France. The pools typically offer liability coverage for
gradual pollution from fixed industrial facilities and emergency costs,
and require an environmental appraisal of properties proposed for
coverage.34
For companies desiring more extensive coverage there is a newer
market in specialist Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL) insur-
ance, offering coverage for gradual environmental pollution.35 Be-
cause of the higher liability exposure, EIL policies are generally
drafted on a claims-made basis, exclude cases of deliberate breach of
legislation and contain a retroactive limitation clause. They are also
written on a site-specific basis with proposed sites subject to an envi-
ronmental assessment before coverage may be offered. Because of
such exclusions and its high cost, EIL insurance did not initially ap-
29. See ABI, JOINT POLLUTION WORKING GROUP, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
UNDERWRITING OF POLLUTION RISKS (1998).
30. Fabrice G. Lorvo, Insurance and Environment in the European Union: In Need of Ac-
tion, 6 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 495, 499 (1994).
31. See, e.g., Robert G. Lee & Stephen Tupper, Claims-made Policies: European Occur-
rences, 4 ENVTL. LIABILITY 25 (1996).
32. Cour de Cassation, l’ère Chambre Civile, 12 Dec. 1990, RGAT 1 (1991); Cour de Cas-
sation, l’ère Chambre Civile, 3 Feb. 1993, RGAT 2 (1993).  See Mikael Hagoplan, France: The
Supreme Court Rules that ‘Claims-Made’ Coverage is a Nullity, 1 INT’L J. INS. L. 52 (1994) (ana-
lysing the Supreme Court’s decision).
33. Marcel Fontane, Claims-Made Policies Under Belgian Law—New Developments, 2
INT’L J. INS. L. 117 (1995).
34. See Lorvo, supra note 30, at 501-508 (summarising the common aspects of pools found
in various Western European countries).
35. See Michael Misch et al., Recent Developments in Insurance Coverage Issues, 31 TORT
& INS. L.J. 335, 341-44 (1996).
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peal to markets, but as EIL underwriting fees and premiums have
stabilized and coverage has broadened, the policies have become
more popular.36 Strengthening environmental regulations have
stimulated demand for EIL coverage,37 and some insurers have also
felt confident enough in the maturing of the environmental insurance
market to underwrite certain policies on an occurrence basis.38 Be-
sides EIL, over 20 niche liability insurance products have emerged,
providing coverage for contractors, transporters and other niche op-
erators.39 Insurers have also developed a new product specifically for
lenders, generically labeled Financial Institution Environmental Li-
ability Insurance.40 The development of new environmentally oriented
insurance techniques and policies has not been confined to contami-
nated land cleanup. In Europe a number of insurers have created
policies that convey incentives for improved environmental perform-
ance for motorists and building owners.41
III.  POTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS TO INSURANCE MARKETS
Despite changes in the insurance sector, one would be naïve to
believe that insurance markets offer a straightforward solution to en-
vironmental risk control. The ability of insurance techniques to pro-
vide incentives for sustainable development and ensure funds for en-
vironmental restoration is affected by a number of factors.
36. Sue Neuman, The New Environmental Insurance Products: When Does it Make Sense to
Buy Them?, ENVTL. L. IN NEW YORK, Nov. 1998, at 179.; Joseph Catanese, A New Era in Pol-
lution Coverage, WASTE AGE, Apr. 1, 2000, at 68.
37. See Carolyn Aldred, U.K. Pollution Regs Driving EIL Market, BUS. INS., Nov. 29, 1999,
at 19.
38. Christopher Winans, Setting the Standard, BEST’S REV.: PROP./CASUALTY INS.
EDITION, Apr., 1997, at 32-33 (1997).
39. See Susan Neuman, Tailored to Fit: Sophisticated Insurance Tools Make Property Pro-
tection Easier, ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY, May 2000, at 3-5; see Corey Stein,
Pollution Insurance Comes of Age, PUB. MGMT., Jul.-Aug. 1999, at 14 (providing a general
overview of potential pollution exposure and the coverages offered).
40. John L. Riedl & Armin R. Callo, Financial Institution Environmental Liability Insur-
ance: New Panacea for Lenders’ Pollution Ills, 6 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 341 (1994).
41. ASSOCIATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN BANKS, SAVINGS BANKS,
AND INSURANCE COMPANIES, TIME TO ACT: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 12 (1998), available at http://www.vfu.de/time2act.pdf.
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A. Liability Standards
One of these factors concerns uncertainty surrounding the risks
sought to be insured.42 Complete uncertainty about the extent of the
risks would “resemble a naked gamble,” while a future entirely pre-
dictable would make insurance superfluous.43 Between these poles, in-
surance functions best when there are predictable probabilities of the
frequency and magnitude of losses that will be suffered by relevant
policyholders. Escalating pollution liabilities initially posed a major
challenge to underwriters because of the paucity of historical claims
necessary for actuarial modeling of losses. Unpredictable judicial de-
cisions and legislative changes can heighten this uncertainty, making
it impossible to quantify and thus insure environmental liability
risks.44 The nature of the applicable environmental liability rules is
crucial to the functioning of insurance markets because companies
make decisions about their level of care and desired coverage based
on their expected losses. If there were no liability rules, other than for
protecting their own property, polluters would have no financial in-
centive to take care and would not benefit by purchasing liability in-
surance.
Modern environmental legislation has increasingly adopted strict
liability standards in relation to environmental damage, with fault-
based liability confined to personal injury.45 Adopting a strict liability
standard arguably reduces the need to resort to expensive litigation to
determine culpability, as it makes claims more predictable than they
would be under a negligence standard.46 The efficiency of fault liabil-
ity by contrast depends on whether the courts can accurately deter-
mine both the optimal standard of care and the injurer’s actual level
of care—a potential source of uncertainty for insurers. In a variety of
jurisdictions, insurance markets have now successfully arisen for envi-
ronmental harms subject to strict liability rules.47
42. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 946 (1988).
43. Id.
44. Paul. K. Freeman & Howard Kunreuther, The Roles of Insurance and the Well Speci-
fied Standards in Dealing With Environmental Risks, 17 RISK MGMT. & DECISION. ECON. 517,
521 (1996).
45. See generally CHRIS CLARKE, UPDATE COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY (2001), available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/liability/legalstudy_full.pdf.
46. Kehne, supra note 18, at 419.
47. See Russ Banham Pollution Protection Gets Easier, TREASURY & RISK MGMT, Nov.-
Dec. 1999, at 61 (focusing on developments in U.S.); Lisa S. Howard, EIL Covers are Catching
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But where strict liability is married with joint and several liability
and retroactive liability, insurance markets may unravel. Abraham
sees retroactive liability as problematic because the introduction of
unanticipated liability necessarily undermines insurers’ ability to pre-
dict legal regimes and risks accurately.48 If, however, insurers can
foresee the possibility of future changes in the liability system that
would create liability for historical pollution, in theory this could be
accommodated through an additional risk premium to address the
“insurer ambiguity.”49 Regarding joint and several liability rules, while
they advance the compensation function of environmental policy by
giving claimants access to a wider pool of tortfeasors, they can un-
dermine underwriting decisions since any claim has the potential to
attain the policy limit ceiling regardless of the contribution by the in-
sured. Kehne believes, “where net assets, rather than contributions to
release problems, represent the primary determinant of liability, in-
surance markets cannot provide effective loss avoidance incentives.”50
Of course, secondary redistribution mechanisms could be introduced
allowing for contributions among multiple tortfeasors,51 but the vi-
ability of redistribution mechanisms depends significantly on the
transaction costs incurred.
Uncertainty in insurance markets can also arise from the inter-
pretation of insurance contracts, as exemplified by the Superfund ex-
perience. The three areas of major contention in the interpretation of
liability under Superfund have been the meaning of “damages” cov-
ered by CGL policies, the meaning of the property damage exclusion
under such policies, and the ambit of the gradual pollution exclusion.52
One of the biggest setbacks Superfund delivered to insurers was the
interpretation made by courts that the costs of remedial action by an
insured at the behest of a public authority through compulsory order
or voluntary settlement qualified “as damages” to be compensated
on in United Kingdom, NAT’L UNDERWRITER: PROP. & CASUALTY RISK & BENEFITS MGMT.,
Feb. 1, 1999, at 3.
48. Abraham, supra note 42, at 957-958; see also Michael Faure & Paul Fenn, Retroactive
Liability and the Insurability of Long-Tail Risks, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 487 (1999) (dis-
cussing the benefits of retroactive liability generally).
49. See Howard Kunreuther et al., Insurer Ambiguity and Market Failure, J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY, Dec. 1993, at 71-72.
50. Kehne, supra note 18, at 419.
51. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple
Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831, 837 (1989) (describing the different rules of apportionment avail-
able).
52. Jonathan R. Nash, Environmental Law: An Economic Approach to the Availability of
Hazardous Waste Insurance, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 455, 474.
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under insurance contracts.53 Courts have also tended to overlook the
pollution exclusion by reinterpreting gradual pollution as “sudden”
from the standpoint of the insured’s awareness of the damages.54 De-
spite these setbacks, as relevant actuarial information accumulated
and liability precedents settled, insurers have resumed coverage of
Superfund-type pollution liabilities.55
B. Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
The pooling and differentiation of risks is crucial to alleviating
problems of uncertainty in insurance calculations. Insurance is most
effective when it pools many independent risks of known probability
and is then able to segregate those risks.56 In statistical terms, better
certainty about the likelihood and severity of loss flows from pooling
many risks. Further, segregating high- from low-risk insureds can re-
duce risk variance, and, consequently, reduce the expected costs of
claims. Segregating risks means policyholders can be charged premi-
ums that reflect their risk profile, and, thus, insureds can be better in-
fluenced on how much to engage in the activity generating the risk.
Risk pooling and differentiation can be undermined by the
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.57 Adverse selection
derives from information asymmetry between parties, as applicants
for insurance generally possess substantially more information about
their risk profile than insurers. The hypothesis is that a dispropor-
tionate number of high-risk applicants then seek to buy insurance
while low-risk choose to avoid it.58 The effect is to undermine the en-
tire premise of risk pooling and differentiation.59 Priest argues for ex-
ample that the crisis in product liability insurance in the United States
53. See id. at 475.
54. See Eugene R. Anderson & Avraham C. Moskowitz, How Much Does the CGL Pollu-
tion Exclusion Really Exclude?, RISK MGMT., Apr. 1984, at 31-32.
55. See Stephen J. Smirti Jr., After CERCLA—The Litigious Explosion on Environmental
Coverages Reached Everest Magnitude, INS. ADVOC. Dec. 9, 1995, at 19 (arguing that 15 years
after the passage of CERCLA, the scope of the defenses available to issuers was well settled).
56. PAUL K. FREEMAN & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
THROUGH INSURANCE, 23-24 (1997).
57. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 66-67 (1988).
58. George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (detailing the phenomenon of adverse selection in the
famous paper).
59. See, e.g., Mark Pauly & Sean Nicholson, Adverse Consequences of Adverse Selection, 24
J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 921 (1999) (describing the costs of adverse selection).
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in the 1980s stemmed mainly from low risk firms dropping out of the
insurance market.60
Lack of adequate information can also arise in relation to moni-
toring changes in the risks posed by parties after securing insurance.
This results in the moral hazard phenomenon, whereby the availabil-
ity of insurance may reduce incentives to be careful.61 If polluting en-
terprises can “ignor[e] the consequences of their actions by insuring
against financial liabilities thereby incurred,” then environmental li-
ability insurance would seem at odds with environmental protection
law.62 Insurers seek to reduce the information deficiencies that fuel
adverse selection and moral hazard through various risk assessment
and classification techniques, deductibles and policy exclusions, and
where possible, by enhanced monitoring. The main methods currently
used for calculating insurance premiums are guaranteed cost insur-
ance, experience-rated insurance and retrospective-rated insurance,63
but some methods face problems addressing the situation of small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) that lack a credible statistical pro-
file of past loss experience.64 Risk differentiation is also not costless,
and is generally only worthwhile for larger enterprises or by organiz-
ing the market into general categories.65 The growth of corporate sub-
scription to environmental management systems (EMSs) such as that
prescribed by the International Organization for Standardization
(e.g., ISO 14001 standard) or the E.U.’s Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme (EMAS) may however provide a convenient means of ex-
tending risk differentiation to control adverse selection.
Pollution prevention by insureds also may be encouraged
through the environmental appraisal of their activities and the differ-
entiation of insurance coverage and premiums to reflect insureds’
level of care. Imposition of deductibles can be an effective discipli-
60. George. L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1524-25 (1987).
61. See Jean-Jacques Laffont, Regulation, Moral Hazard and Insurance of Environmental
Risks, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 319 (1995); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J.
ECON. 541 (1979).
62. Jacqueline Lipton, Insurance for Environmental Liability: Some Policy Issues, 6 INT’L
INS. L. REV. 198, 200 (1998).
63. Jan McDonald, Financial Responsibility Requirements: Liability Insurance as an Envi-
ronmental Management Tool, 4 ENVTL. LIABILITY 2 (1996).
64. Id.
65. See especially Severin Bohrenstein, The Economics of Costly Risk Sorting in Competi-
tive Insurance Markets, 9 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 25 (1989).
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nary tool as it exposes the insured to some potential losses.66 Exclu-
sions can also promote responsible behavior by precluding coverage
for certain types of losses. As already noted, CGL policies now gen-
erally exclude coverage for damages caused by gradual pollution, and
in some cases also for sudden and accidental discharges.67 Abraham
suggests that exclusion of gradual pollution from coverage reduces
moral hazard because gradual pollution “is more likely than a sudden
and accidental discharge to result from the inherent character of the
insured’s operations than from an unintended mishap.”68 Gradual
losses are usually more predictable costs, and are more likely to be
expected or intended by the insured.
C. Insurers’ Financial Resources
An additional assumption of reliance on insurance markets to
control environmental problems is that they hold sufficient financial
resources to meet claims. The financial resources of the insurance in-
dustry are, like other business sectors, finite and it would appear im-
possible for insurers globally to cover the range of environmental
harms generated by modern societies. For instance, the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency in the early 1990s predicted hazardous
site cleanup costs of between USD $500 billion to $1 trillion over the
next fifty years,69 and average remediation costs for individual Super-
fund sites estimated at some $35 million.70 By contrast, the total re-
serves of the property and casualty insurance industry in the United
States were estimated for the same period at between only a third to a
fifth of these global sums.71 Although insurance regulation usually
specifies minimum capital adequacy, insurers like other companies
are not immune from insolvency. Massive environmental liability
claims incurred by insurers that failed to properly forecast risks have
66. See Vernon L. Grose, Risk Management from a Technological Perspective, 17 GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. – ISSUES & PRAC. 335 (1992).
67. Peter E. Kanaris & Lawrence D. Mason, Common Exclusions in the First-party Prop-
erty Insurance Policy and Their Application to Environmental Claims, TORT & INS. L.J. 809
(1995).
68. Abraham, supra note 42, at 953.
69. Dale Jensen & Cynthia Unger, Environmental Liability, DENVER BUS. May-April
1991, at 18 .
70. LLOYD S. DIXON et al., PRIVATE-SECTOR EXPENDITURES AND TRANSACTION COSTS
AT 18 SUPERFUND SITES (1993).
71. Id.  See also Standard & Poor’s, Environmental Liability Strains P/C Insurers, CREDIT
WEEK, Oct. 30, 1995, at 43.
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been known to cause the collapse and insolvency of insurance firms.72
If insurers go bust, then ultimately government (public) resources will
be tapped to finance environmental restoration.
The problem of insuring against major, long term environmental
risks could be overcome through the development of secondary mar-
kets for risk trading. Recognizing the limits of insurers’ and reinsur-
ers’ ability to finance catastrophe risk on their own, financial engi-
neers have devised new alternative risk transfer markets based
around catastrophe futures and weather derivatives as a means of fi-
nancing risks using a capital market solution.73 This process of “securi-
tization” in effect enables insurers to share catastrophe risk with in-
vestors.74 To date, the principal forms of securitization are catastrophe
or “act of God” bonds, contingent surplus notes and exchange-traded
catastrophe options. For example, an insurance-based catastrophe
bond typically provides that if the issuer suffers a particular pre-
defined catastrophe loss (such as a hurricane or earthquake),  repay-
ment of principal is deferred or forgiven.75 If a disaster occurs, the in-
surer that issued the catastrophe bond can pay claims with the funds
that would otherwise have gone to the bondholders. If good weather
prevails during the bond period, investors gain by the return of their
principal plus considerable interest payments. A number of European
and North American insurers have now introduced such mechanisms
to financial markets as a way to expand the insurance capacity to
cover natural catastrophe risks.76
Besides the challenge of ensuring funds to meet large environ-
mental risks, the financial integrity of insurance markets depends on
limiting the often high transaction costs and diversion of resources
72. See, e.g., Lisa S. Howard, Russian UK Insurer Goes Bust, NAT’L UNDERWRITER: PROP.
& CASUALTY RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Aug. 31, 1998, at 2 (discussing impact of U.S. asbestos,
pollution and health claims on Baltic General Insurance Company); Lisa S. Howard, Insurer
Stability Seen Tied to Superfund Reform, NAT’L UNDERWRITER: PROP. & CASUALTY RISK &
BENEFITS MGMT., May 9, 1994, at 29 (warning regarding possible insolvency of insurers in the
United States).
73. See also Stephen P. D’Arcy & Virginia G. France, Catastrophe Futures: A Better Hedge
for Insurers, 59 J. RISK & INS. 575 (1992); Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe In-
surance: Capital Markets and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205 (1997).
74. See Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Managing Unknown Risks, J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT., Winter 1998, at 85; Richard E. Smith, et al., Reinventing Reinsurance through Capital
Markets, 22 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. – ISSUES & PRAC. 26 (1997).
75. See Johannes S. Tynes, Catastrophe Risk Securitization, J. INS. REG., Fall 2000, at 3.
76. Don L. Kirk, Insurers Voice Need to Combat Climate Risks, BUS. INS., Nov. 8, 1999, at
45-46.
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into litigation rather than pollution cleanup.77 The deep-pocket syn-
drome has led, particularly in the United States, to insurers joining
banks as primary targets for the imposition of financial liability to re-
habilitate polluted sites.78 Abraham observes, “mass tort and [Super-
fund] coverage claims are rarely paid without dispute. Too much
money is at stake, too many other provisions in [public liability] poli-
cies potentially limit or eliminate coverage . . . and insurers appar-
ently collected too few premium dollars in anticipation of long-tail
coverage liability.”79 Most obviously, government can assist private in-
surance functioning by setting well-specified legal standards to pro-
vide the predictability the industry needs so that it can accurately cal-
culate risks. In recent years evidence suggests that the initial
“insurance crisis” in the United States has subsided as clearer liability
precedents have become judicially established and claims patterns
stabilized.80
D. Addressing Ecological Damage
There is also the question of the kinds of environmental damages
that insurance markets can be expected to cover. Insurance is a finan-
cial tool that arose to protect economic resources wherein another
potential limitation lies. Protection of property and public health is an
important aspect of environmental policy served by pollution insur-
ance, but where ecological processes lack an economic proxy then
they may fail to receive adequate protection. There may be no eco-
nomic proxy because liability for environmental damage, such as to
fauna and landscapes, cannot be effectively imposed. Harm caused to
the natural, unowned environment poses difficulties in terms of the
ready applicability of liability rules unless legislation confers public
rights to recover, perhaps along the lines of the public trust doctrine.81
Secondly, problems may exist in measuring environmental damage
for compensation purposes. Insurers expressed concern regarding the
European Commission’s White Paper on Environmental Liability be-
77. JAN P. ACTON & LLOYD S. DIXON, SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS (1992).
78. Richard K. Harper & Stephen C. Adams, CERCLA and Deep Pockets: Market Re-
sponse to the Superfund Program, 14 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 107 (1996).
79. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Maze of Mega-Coverage Litigation, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2102, 2106 (1997).
80. See, e.g., Environmental Liabilities Decline, BEST’S REV.: PROP./CASUALTY INS. ED.,
Sep. 1997, at 86 (showing U.S. stabilising trend).
81. Brian Jones, Deterring, Compensating, and Remedying Environmental Damage: The
Contribution of Tort Liability, in HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT: THE RIGHT TO
COMPENSATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 11, 13 (Peter Wetterstein ed., 1997).
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cause of the perceived difficulty for placing a clear value on natural
resource losses for underwriting purposes.82
These problems however may not be insurmountable. Firstly, le-
gal systems are increasingly sensitive to compensatory damages be-
yond traditional indicia of harm to person or property. In relation to
pure ecological loss, the possible solution to difficulties of measuring
damage to environmental systems is to restrict liability (and hence in-
surance coverage) to situations involving significant damage with
damages measured according to the costs of ecological restoration.83
Both the White Paper and some legislation covering natural resource
damage deal with compensation in this way.84 Internationally, proto-
cols to the oil pollution liability treaties adopted in 1992 expanded the
definition of pollution damage to include compensation for costs in-
curred in reinstating impaired environments.85 Where environmental
damage is not repairable, polluters could be directed to fund repara-
tion of equivalent ecosystems. To the extent that problems of uncer-
tainty surrounding damage remain that could undermine the insur-
ability of the situation, Kunreuther and others propose the inclusion
of an additional (“insurance ambiguity”) risk premium.86
Secondly, a number of jurisdictions enable the state or desig-
nated public interest groups to act as plaintiffs on behalf of damaged
environments. The United States’s Superfund legislation authorizes
designated trustees on behalf of the public to recover damages for
harm to or loss of natural resources caused by a hazardous substance
release.87 Italy legislated in 1986 to allow the state to recovery for
pure ecological restoration costs without being limited to the market
82. Lisa S. Howard, Superfund’s Lessons Cause European Union to Proceed with Caution
on Pollution Liability, NAT’L UNDERWRITER: PROP. & CASUALTY RISK & BENEFITS MGMT.,
Feb. 21, 2000, at  3, 4.
83. There is considerable literature on natural resource damage valuation. See, e.g., Rich-
ard C. Bishop & Robert E. Unsworth, Assessing Natural Resource Damages Using Environ-
mental Amenities, 11 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 35 (1994).
84. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WHITE PAPER ON ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY, 19 (2000)
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/liability/el_full.pdf.  See, e.g., Oil Pollution
Act 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2706(f); Superfund, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1); Environmental Liability
Act (Germany), § 16.
85. See David J. Wilkinson, Moving the Boundaries of Compensable Environmental Dam-
age Caused by Marine Oil Spills: The Effect of Two New International Protocols, 5 J. ENVTL. L.
71, 82-85 (1993).
86. Kunreuther et al., supra note 49, at 71-72.
87. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).  See also Frederick R. Anderson, Natural Re-
sources Damages, Superfund, and the Courts, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 405, 406 (1989); Carl
W. Breeding & Lloyd R. Cress, Jr., Natural Resource Damages under CERCLA: A New Begin-
ning?, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 23 (1992).
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value.88 Where difficulties persist with environmental damage valua-
tion, and if appropriate plaintiffs are lacking, measures that reduce
the likelihood of such losses are obviously required. Within insurance
contracts, inclusion of claim ceilings and high deductibles to promote
safety practices by insureds may help. But since neither monitoring
nor additional risk premiums can entirely solve the problem of risk of
ecological damage, the problem may sometimes need to be addressed
through criminal sanctions and other measures that compel develop-
ers to adopt environmentally careful practices.
IV.  COMPULSORY ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE
A. Regulating Insurance Markets
The foregoing discussion has canvassed various potential threats
to environmental liability insurance markets. While the state can fa-
cilitate insurance by creating appropriate liability standards, other re-
sponses are needed from insurers themselves, such as adapting poli-
cies to control adverse selection and moral hazard, or tapping the
capital markets to ensure adequate financial resources to meet claims.
Another possibility is for the state itself to more actively regulate the
provision of insurance including mandating coverage for those en-
gaged in environmentally sensitive activities. The challenge is to de-
termine the circumstances when insurance should be made compul-
sory or otherwise regulated to offset incentives to externalize
environmental risk.
According to Shavell’s seminal model of third-party liability in-
surance, regulation of insurance is generally unnecessary, since the
market will normally generate the socially optimal level of insur-
ance.89 Shavell argued that few insureds would be careless and cause
loss if they knew that their premiums would increase or coverage
would be denied. Accordingly, where insurers can efficiently monitor
insureds’ level of care, regulating the insurance market would not en-
hance insureds’ willingness to reduce risk. However, where insurance
markets fail to produce adequate incentives to reduce risk, Shavell
advocated mandatory coverage provided the insurer is able to moni-
88. Act No. 349 of July 8, 1986, 162 Gazzetta Ufficiale, Suppl. Ord. No. 59, 5ff, discussed in
Andrea Bianchi, Harm to the Environment in Italian Practice: The Interaction of International
Law and Domestic Law, in HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 81, at 103, 105.  See also
Environmental Damage Act 1994 (Finland), § 6;  Pollution Control Act 1981 (Norway), para.
58.
89. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, chs. 8-10 (1987).
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tor an insured’s conduct.90 Market failure may occur where injurers
are able to avoid full liability because victims cannot identify the cul-
prit or declines to sue (e.g., owing to a fear of high litigation costs).91
Without insurance, there is an insufficient deterrence imperative
since injurers will base their level of care on their expected liability,
which in this situation is less than the entire expected losses caused by
their activities.92
A second reason for regulating insurance is that businesses pro-
tected by limited corporate liability93 may be inclined to purchase less
than full insurance to cover their potential harms.94 Schwartz reasons
the basic problem is that a company’s incentives to insure against
knowable risk decline when “its liability exposure greatly exceeds its
wealth.”95 In Shavell’s analysis, “insuring against liability that one
would not otherwise fully bear, because one’s assets would be ex-
hausted, is in a sense a private waste for a potentially judgment-proof
party.”96 But an insurance requirement would compel the business to
internalize victims’ expected losses through the premium.97 Manda-
tory environmental insurance may be a more politically feasible and
economically efficient means of addressing corporate environmental
externalities than diluting corporate limited liability or expanding
creditor liabilities.
But if insurers’ cannot monitor their insureds’ level of care,
Shavell’s analysis suggests the injurer’s incentives to exercise proper
care may be lacking, and the insured will not seek full coverage for
reducible risks. In the context of pollution cleanup costs that are both
uncertain and uncapped ex ante, Shavell believed that insurance
would create a moral hazard because premiums would not corre-
spond to expected losses.98 This problem can be compounded by the
90. Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 53-55
(1996).
91. Kehne, supra note 18, at 410.
92. SHAVELL, supra note 89, at 7.
93. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Li-
ability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (explaining the economic effects of lim-
ited corporate liability).  See also Janet C. Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through
a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1992).
94. Jost, supra note 4.
95. Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Sub-
stances and Remote Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 709 (1985).
96. SHAVELL, supra note 89, at 10.
97. See Mattias K. Polborn, Mandatory Insurance and the Judgment-Proof Problem, 18
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 141 (1998).
98. SHAVELL, supra note 89, at 198.
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presence of statutory retroactive and joint and several liabilities,
which interferes with insurers’ ability to predict or limit the range of
accidents covered. In such circumstances, Shavell recommended pro-
hibiting insurance or, at most, allowing partial coverage involving
high deductibles so as to minimize moral hazard.99 Forbidding insur-
ance, argued Shavell, would increase the risk enterprises need to
bear. To ensure that victims receive compensation, he favored victims
retaining first-party insurance to protect themselves from accidents
and to provide compensation in case of personal injury or property
damage. First-party insurance is seen as offering a more efficient
means (due to lower transaction costs) of compensation for injured
persons than third-party liability insurance.100
The Shavell model can be criticized for its overemphasis on the
deterrence and risk-spreading functions of insurance at the expense
of compensation goals. By restricting investment and reducing com-
pensation payable to victims, Polborn argues “it is never possible to
increase welfare by prohibiting the voluntary purchase of insur-
ance.”101 Leiter suggests there are situations in the environmental con-
text in which liability insurance is socially desirable despite imperfec-
tions in insurance markets.102 She argues that the compensation
function deserves greater weight because “many environmental acci-
dents involve losses to the commons rather than to private individu-
als, and no suitable analog (sic) to first-party insurance exists for such
public losses.”103 Furthermore, “even in situations involving only pri-
vate victims, first-party insurance may prove an inefficient and inef-
fective source of compensation for victims of environmental losses.”104
An additional reason for compulsory liability insurance may exist
where responsible parties lack adequate information to correctly de-
termine whether they should seek insurance coverage.105 There is em-
pirical evidence regarding people’s distorted perception of environ-
mental risks, especially individuals’ underestimation of the
99. Id. chs. 8-10.
100. Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. – ISSUES & PRAC. 166, 178 (2000).
101. Polborn, supra note 97, at 141-42.
102. Amanda C. Leiter, Environmental Insurance: Does it Defy the Rules?, 25 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 259, 261 (2001).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. MICHAEL G. FAURE & DAVID GRIMEAUD, FINANCIAL ASSURANCE ISSUES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 148 (2000).
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probabilities or scale of low probability environmental disasters.106
Underestimation of risks can lead to a lower than socially optimal
level of insurance.
B. Organizing Mandatory Environmental Insurance
Mandating insurance before enterprises engage in environmental
liability-generating activities is therefore one significant alternative to
the constraints of current voluntary approaches.107 Provided the moral
hazard problem can be controlled, compulsory insurance offers the
prospect of a better compensation safety-net for economic injuries
and environmental damage, while possibly maintaining the deter-
rence effect of liability at least as well as in the circumstances where
the Shavell model suggests that insurance be proscribed.108 The prin-
ciple of compulsory insurance is well established in many sectors of
the economy, including: occupational liability; automobile liability;
aircraft operators and carriers’ liability; and professional indemnity
for certain vocations.109
McDonald argues mandatory insurance offers several advantages
over other fiscal options to ensure environmental harms can be ad-
dressed.110 Obliging all operators to obtain insurance would minimize
the problem of adverse selection. As both high- and low-risk firms
must have insurance (although with individual premiums) a larger
pool from which payments may be made is created. In due time, the
larger pool could also reduce the cost of such insurance. Companies
may also prefer the insurance option for meeting mandatory financial
responsibility regulations because it frees up company funds for other
purposes that might not be available where bonds or other indemni-
ties are availed.111 By assigning prices to risk in competitive markets,
insurance may provide more accurate assessments than other finan-
cial tests. Insurance companies are far more likely to give meticulous
106. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman, et
al., eds., 1982) (describing risk perception and bias); T. McDaniels, et al., Characterizing Per-
ception of Ecological Risk, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 575 (1995).
107. See generally J. Cowell, Compulsory Environmental Liability Insurance, in INSURANCE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 327 (H. Bocken & D. Ryckbost eds, 1991); Feess & Hege, supra
note 4.
108. Kehne, supra note 18, at 403.
109. OECD, INSURANCE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN OECD COUNTRIES, ASIAN
ECONOMIES AND CEEC AND NIS COUNTRIES 22-23 (1999).
110. McDonald, supra note 63, at 6.
111. Peter List, Insuring the Spill,  GLOBAL FIN., Sep. 2000, at 55, 56.
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attention to risk portfolios than would shareholders and managers of
non-financial enterprises.
Compulsory liability insurance schemes complemented by the
statutory provision for direct action against the insurer can facilitate
the enforcement of claims to the benefit of victims.112 Availability of
direct action means an insurer cannot avoid payout by reason that
their client was negligent or otherwise breached conditions of insur-
ance. Direct action provisions can also stimulate deterrence because
of the strong incentives on the part of guarantors to police the activi-
ties of insureds. For example, Superfund’s financial responsibility
rules require that guarantors of the assurance be liable for direct ac-
tion.113 Typical defenses of fraud or misrepresentation by the insured
cannot be used to deny coverage, and the only defense available to a
guarantor under Superfund is that the loss was caused by the “willful
misconduct” of the insured.
Under compulsory insurance, enterprises considered by insurers
as too risky for coverage would be compelled by financial responsi-
bility stipulations either to adopt appropriate safety measures or sus-
pend operations. Company adherence to international environmental
standards (e.g., ISO or EMAS) could provide a convenient proxy for
measuring environmental safety with respect to processes and
plants.114 Insurance companies are often better placed than investors
or other financial institutions to monitor corporate environmental
performance. Corporate participation in approved environmental
management systems (EMSs) would facilitate insurers’ monitoring ef-
forts. Should, however, insurers decline coverage, firms wishing to
continue operations would be compelled to appeal for government
intervention in the form of waiver of the applicable financial respon-
sibility requirements (FRRs). Because mandatory environmental in-
surance may have an adverse economic impact on industry, particu-
larly small and medium sized enterprises unable to afford insurance,
regulators would need to undertake some form of risk-benefit analy-
sis on behalf of the community to determine whether the benefits of
the activity are sufficient to justify waiving the FRR.
112. The term “direct action” means a party suffering injuries or damage for which another
is legally responsible may bring suit against the other’s liability insurer without joining or first
obtaining a judgment against the insured.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c)(1-2).
114. On the emerging relevance of environmental management system standards to the fi-
nancial services sector, see Bettina Furrer & Hugenschmidt, Financial Services and ISO 14001,
GREENER MGMT. INT’L, Winter 1999, at 32.
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In addition to providing the basis for the insurance policy, envi-
ronmental site surveys under mandatory insurance offer various
benefits. Kehne discovered that “insurers’ advantage over individual
insureds in collecting and analyzing risk data, and in researching and
developing safety standards often outweighed any attenuation of
safety incentives that resulted from the pooling of risks.”115 While in-
dividual insurers may lack the resources and expertise to undertake
detailed risk assessment, Faure and Grimeaud suggest that insurers
can carry out joint research and so achieve economies of scale.116 Sur-
veys undertaken can disclose areas of risk which are effectively unin-
surable, but which may be removed or mitigated by investment in
technological improvements. Secondly, by facilitating accurate speci-
fication and description to underwriters of the risks to be insured, an
environmental survey could eventually assist reduction of premiums
and minimize the chance of non-disclosure that insurers’ would oth-
erwise exploit in seeking to reject claims. Furthermore, the environ-
mental survey could provide a basis for formulating corporate safety
procedures and contingency plans for pollution incidents.
In terms of the design of a CGL policy for a compulsory insur-
ance regime, it may be appropriate to exclude gradual or expected
pollution, as these are generally reducible risks that can often be
avoided by more care on the part of the insured, but unexpected
events that are sudden and accidental (from all parties’ perspectives)
should be covered. In defining the parameters of the “sudden and ac-
cidental” exception, Leiter argues that it should be interpreted “to re-
store coverage only for pollution events that are unexpected, abrupt
and short-lived because allowing coverage of slower events (even if
unexpected) fosters moral hazard, as insureds are more likely to es-
cape liability or to be insolvent by the time suit is brought.”117 Further,
government may have to allow insurers to choose between occur-
rence and claims-made coverage. Forcing insurers to offer occur-
rence-based coverage in the context of highly uncertain pollution
risks would probably be unacceptable to the industry.118 The accept-
ability of occurrence-based coverage will depend on improvement in
relevant scientific information and stabilization of liability rules so
that insurers can properly assess and price environmental risks they
take on. Uncertainty regarding some environmental risks means they
115. Kehne, supra note 18, at 407.
116. Faure and Grimeaud, supra note 105, at 98.
117. Leiter, supra note 102, at 308.
118. Id. at 141.
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cannot be insured as readily as long-established mass risks, such as in
relation to automobile insurance or employers’ liability.
Introduction of mandatory insurance, of course, changes the na-
ture of the relationship between insurer and insured. By casting in-
surers as surrogate regulators it would affect a variety of aspects of
the insurance industry’s traditional role. As mandatory insurance
amounts to a license to operate, “the insurer would become, in effect,
a watchdog over its customers rather than a service provider.”119 At a
minimum, insurers would check to see if clients are properly licensed,
and coverage would expect to be conditional upon the insured’s com-
pliance with the license operating conditions. Many insurance policies
already deny coverage where there is a violation of applicable regula-
tions.120 Optimal care however could be higher than mere regulatory
compliance, in which case insurers need means to promote superior
levels of safety among clients, such as offering incentives for subscrip-
tion to relevant third-party EMSs that provide for systematic auditing
and reporting of environmental performance.
A further consequence of making insurers surrogate regulators
would be to dramatically enhance their involvement in the assessment
and management of their insureds’ risks.121 Access to all relevant in-
formation to assess corporate environmental performance of course is
crucial if insurers are to be effective risk managers. Insurers are prima
facie strategically well placed to gather information and engage in risk
management, and reflect these costs through premium differentiation.
Major environmental insurance providers in the United States now
often include environmental engineering support, serving to improve
project supervision and review project data relevant to underwriting
decisions.122 But insurers’ ability and willingness to monitor for risky
activities can be limited in a variety of ways.123 Unlike voluntary in-
surance situations where future coverage can be denied, the coopera-
tion of the insured cannot be readily guaranteed under a compulsory
liability insurance model. Further, because environmental risk analy-
sis is costly, the calibration of premiums according to risk cannot be
pursued indefinitely, but only to the point where the marginal gains
119. Freeman and Kunreuther, supra note 56, at 102.
120. Faure and Grimeaud, supra note 105, at 125.
121. Id. at 142.
122. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
INSURANCE FOR BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 23 (1997).
123. See Steven A. Kunzman, The Insurer as Surrogate Regulator of the Hazardous Waste
Industry: Solution or Perversion?, 20 FORUM 469, 477 (1985) (detailing the inspection and risk
assessment activities of insurers).
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from differentiation equal the marginal cost of further analysis and
monitoring.124 Moreover, where an insured considers it is concluding a
period of insurance coverage, there may be no incentive to avoid in-
curring higher premiums. Monitoring can also be complicated where
environmental protection insurance does not comprise a plain, uni-
tary contract, but, as is often the case, involves complex arrangements
of interconnected covers with reinsurance support.
There are, on the other hand, several ways these information
deficits and monitoring weaknesses can be mitigated. The problem of
multiple, overlapping covers can be managed through the develop-
ment of new integrated insurance policies, as has occurred in Dutch
insurance markets.125 Secondly, the effectiveness of insurers’ environ-
mental site surveys could be supplemented with government-supplied
data such as that generated through corporate environmental report-
ing rules and other forms of compulsory reporting by business.126 In-
surers could also rely on compliance with third-party EMS certifica-
tions as evidence of clients’ environmental performance. The ISO
standards, EMAS and industry-generated codes of practice provide a
wealth of surrogate environmental standards and information that in-
surers can avail in assessing the risks of prospective policyholders.127
There is already evidence that insurance markets are acknowledging
firms’ accreditation to EMSs when underwriting and determining
coverage; discounts of up to 30% on EIL insurance have been report-
edly offered to chemical manufacturers subscribed to the  Responsi-
ble Care voluntary program.128 Beyond premium discounts, insurers
could possibly make coverage contingent on adherence to relevant
EMSs.129
To cast insurers into active risk management also requires
equipping them with the means of directly influencing their clients’
124. Martin T. Katzman, Societal Risk Management through the Insurance Market, in
MARKET-BASED PUBLIC POLICY 21, 30  (Richard C. Hula ed., 1988).
125. Michael Faure, Environmental Damage Insurance in the Netherlands, 10 ENVTL.
LIABILITY 31, 37 (2002).
126. See, e.g, Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Disclosure of Contingent Environmental Li-
abilities by Public Companies under the Federal Securities Laws, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129
(1992) (describing disclosure requirements under the U.S. securities laws).
127. See How to Open Pollution Coverage Market - Make Policy Contingent on Obeying En-
vironmental Code, INS. ADVOCATE, Apr. 5, 1997, at 10.
128. See Ellen Rafferty, Participants in Responsible Care Offered an Insurance Discount,
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Feb. 1998, at 48; David Hunter, Responsible Care Earns Discount on
EIL-Premiums, CHEMICAL WK., July 23, 1997, at 11.
129. See Christopher Winans, Setting the Standard, BEST’S REV.: PROP./CASUALTY INS. ED.,
Apr. 1997, at 32.
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behavior. Insurers need possession of suitable sanctions to control re-
calcitrant businesses, at a minimum non-renewal of coverage where
there has been a breach of prescribed safety measures. Cancellation
would compel the insured to return to the insurance market to buy
new coverage from another insurer who, doubtless, discovering the
reasons for the original coverage cancellation would charge a higher
premium. Compulsory insurance markets will ultimately need gov-
ernment assistance and intervention to have credible sanctions. In
other insurance contexts, for example, government penalties are im-
posed where individuals fail to carry compulsory insurance such as
the case with third-party automobile insurance.130 But compulsory en-
vironmental insurance would likely be more contentious because of
its ability to restrict major development projects. In Germany, for in-
stance, a government proposal to amend the Environmental Liability
Act 1990 to enroll insurers as an alternative or replacement to con-
ventional development authorization procedures has so far not been
implemented.131 The German proposal for a combination of liability
insurance and independent expert assessment/approval for new facili-
ties has been resisted not merely because insurers wished to avoid a
policing role, but also out of fear of being drawn into political debates
regarding development preferences.132 Compulsory liability insurance
is likely to be more acceptable to relevant stakeholders where the
regulatory system retains other options for demonstrating financial
responsibility, such as positing of bonds and passing regulatory finan-
cial tests, so that new, innovative industries posing uncertain risks
would not be stymied by insurance barriers.133
The ability of insurers to deny claims because of fraud or other
violations of the insurance contract is the most basic sanction insurers
possess in ordinary insurance markets. But this can conflict with al-
lowing direct action against insurers to facilitate the enforcement of
victims’ claims. Denying coverage for losses caused by breach of
safety standards would be at odds with the compensation function of
insurance systems.134 Compensation to third-party victims of pollution
would be sacrificed in the quest for deterrence. Yet, by allowing en-
130. See, e.g., Velella Omnibus Auto Insurance Reform Bill Would Sharply Increase Unin-
sured Penalties, INS. ADVOC., Jan. 11, 1997, at 4.
131. Don L. Kirk, German Industry Ill at Ease with EIL, 30 BUS. INS., May 27, 1996, at 17.
132. Id.
133. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 88-89 (1996).
134. Kenneth S. Abraham, Cost Internalization, Insurance, and Toxic Tort Compensation
Funds, 2 VA J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 123, 143-44 (1982).
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forcement of claims despite fraud, insurers could no longer be “as-
sured of the cooperation of their insureds in determining insurability
and rating risk.”135 One compromise solution proposed would be to
invalidate exclusions as between the insurer and insured’s victims but
allow such exclusion between the insurer and the insured.136 Further-
more, the imposition of criminal sanctions for fraud or failure to co-
operate in the processing of claims would strengthen the provision of
insurance.
Competitive pressures that encourage reduced coverage and re-
duced premium fees could also undermine the regulatory effective-
ness of compulsory insurance regimes unless there is corrective gov-
ernment intervention. Not only would insureds tend to seek the
cheapest insurance policies that enable them to meet FRRs, but in-
surers, competing for business on the basis of price, would also tend
to offer the minimum coverage allowable because the fewer injured
persons claiming against insurers the lower the insurance premiums.
As LoPucki sees it, “unscrupulous insurers might trade off enforce-
ment of expensive loss prevention rules for minor increases in the
premium.”137 Because compulsory liability insurance is primarily for
the benefit of the injured third-party, the shift to a compulsory insur-
ance system would require insurance regulators to intervene and limit
market-produced exclusions and exceptions that could undermine the
regime’s goals.
Finally, there has also been debate about the appropriateness of
statutory financial caps on liability insurance coverage. Leiter argues
that cleanup damages that cannot be estimated with reasonable accu-
racy arguably should be either capped or excluded from coverage.138
The E.U. White Paper on Environmental Liability also suggested that
there should be a statutory financial cap on environmental damages
so as to reduce uncertainty and thereby enhance the viability of in-
surance markets.139 But besides detracting from the compensation and
deterrence aims of environmental liability, Faure and Grimeaud be-
lieve caps are often unnecessary since “it is usually not the amount of
the expected damage that causes uninsurability of risks, but more of-
ten the unpredictability of certain risks.”140 If insurability problems
135. LoPucki, supra note 133, at 82.
136. Abraham, supra note 134, at 145.
137. LoPucki, supra note 133, at 80.
138. Leiter, supra note 102, at 308.
139. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 84.
140. FAURE & GRIMEAUD, supra note 105, at 165.
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exist, they suggest that obligations to insure should be up to a certain
level of coverage, but with the liability of the injurer unlimited, as is
the case already in regard to insurance requirements for nuclear
power facilities.141 The advantage with this approach is that “the in-
centives for care-taking by the injurer remain at least partially into
(sic) existence because the injurer is still exposed to risk in case the
magnitude of the harm would be higher than the insured amount.”142
C. Implementing Mandatory Environmental Insurance
Requirements for environmental liability insurance typically fea-
ture within the financial responsibility rules contained in pollution
control legislation. Financial responsibility is commonly required in
relation to activities where the size of potential environmental dam-
age costs is large compared to the value of the firm generating risks,
especially in the case of latent environmental risks that may not mani-
fest for many years, and for ensuring the availability of financial re-
sources for site restoration and post closure monitoring and mainte-
nance. Financial responsibility is often at the discretion of the
regulator; for example, under Britain’s Environmental Protection Act
1990, in considering whether the prospective license holder is a “fit
and proper person,”143 the Environment Agency is to consider
whether the holder must make “financial provision adequate to dis-
charge the obligations arising from the license.”144 Besides insurance,
FRRs may be satisfied by, inter alia, lodgement of a performance
bond, self-insurance (involving demonstration of corporate financial
strength) and financial guaranty (involving an indemnity agreement
with another firm). Insurance tends to be regulators’ preferred FRR
as it requires less administrative oversight than self-insurance and fi-
nancial guaranty, and better ensures future cost recovery. Compul-
sory insurance has been long established in various countries in rela-
tion to nuclear facility liability and oil pollution liability, and is
increasingly required in the context of handling hazardous materials
and ordinary pollution emission licensing.145
141. See generally Michael Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Nuclear Acci-
dent Law, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1997).
142. FAURE & GRIMEAUD, supra note 105, at 166.
143. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 74 (U.K.).
144. Id. § 74(3)(c).
145. See Ridgway M. Hall, Jr., The Problem of Unending Liability for Hazardous Waste
Management, 38 BUS. L. 593, 615-617 (1983) (explaining U.S. statutory requirements for envi-
ronmental liability insurance).
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Elaborate mandatory financial responsibility rules exist in the
United States. Various environmental statutes impose FRRs on waste
managers, landfill operators and other polluters, such as the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act 1976,146 Superfund,147 and the Clean
Air Act.148 While these Acts do not require insurance as the financial
responsibility option, they have encouraged its use.149 Licensed opera-
tors must typically demonstrate financial responsibility in relation to
third-party liabilities, gradual pollution damage and for site closure
and after care.150 Superfund’s financial responsibility provisions, which
may apply to cargo ships and generators and transporters of hazard-
ous substances, oblige coverage of liability for cleanup expenses and
natural resource damages.151 Not all business operations regulated by
Superfund must demonstrate financial responsibility and, signifi-
cantly, financial responsibility is generally not associated with the
controversial hazardous waste site remediation requirements of the
Act.
Internationally, there are increasing requirements for environ-
mental insurance or equivalent in treaty law. Thus, the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 obliges
ship owners to maintain liability insurance (or other financial secu-
rity) when carrying cargo that exceeds the specified tonnage.152 Ship
owners’ liability backed by a compulsory insurance system is also
provided for in the 1996 International Convention on Liability and
Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Haz-
ardous and Noxious Substances by Sea.153 Both conventions provide
for environmental damage to be compensated where it is related to
restoration measures. International treaties governing liability for nu-
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1994).
147. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. 9601-9675 (1994).
148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-671 (2001).
149. See Martin T. Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and the Internalization of Envi-
ronmental Risks, 5 POL’Y STUD. J. 614 (1986).
150. Jonathan R. Nash, Environmental Law: An Economic Approach to the Availability of
Hazardous Waste Insurance, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 455, 460.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 9608 (1994); see also Leslie Cheek, Risk-Spreaders or Risk-Eliminators? An
Insurer’s Perspective on the Liability and Financial Responsibility Provisions of RCPA and
CERCLA, 2 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 149 (1982).
152. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969,
art. VII. 973 U.N.T.S. No. 3.
153. May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406.
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clear technologies also require that operators of plants maintain in-
surance (or other financial security).154
Although there is increasing interest among some E.U. member
states for compulsory environmental insurance mechanisms, this op-
tion did not feature strongly in the European Commission’s White
Paper on Environmental Liability.155 The Commission acknowledged
that insurance regimes could be an important lever for improved en-
vironmental performance, but reasoned that a mandatory regime de-
pended on improved “qualitative and reliable quantitative criteria for
recognition and measurement of environmental damage.”156 It rec-
ommended “the EC regime should not impose an obligation to have
financial security, in order to allow the necessary flexibility as long as
experience with the new regime still has to be gathered. The provision
of financial security by the insurance and banking sectors . . . should
take place on a voluntary basis.”157 While some insurers have indi-
cated their willingness to cover a liability regime along the lines pro-
posed by the White Paper,158 others oppose compulsory insurance
partly because of expectations to cover uncertain environmental
damage costs.159
Regarding existing national systems, Germany’s Environmental
Liability Act 1990160 provides for compulsory environmental liability
insurance for certain hazardous industries up to specified coverage
levels, although as noted earlier this scheme has not yet been imple-
mented.161 The Danish Contaminated Soil Act 1999 obliges owners of
large oil tanks to take out insurance against potential oil contamina-
tion liability costs, up to a limit of DKK 2 million.162 Both Sweden and
154. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, art.
10, 956 U.N.T.S. 251;  Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963,
art. VIII, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265.
155. European Commission, supra note 84.
156. Id. § 4.9.
157. Id.
158. Chris Clarke, The European Commission’s White Paper on Environmental Liability, 3
INT’L J. INS. L. 188, 203 (2000).
159. See, e.g., GESAMTVERBAND DER DEUTSCHEN VERSICHERUNGSWIRT-SCHAFT,
SUBMISSION TO THE WHITE PAPER ON ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: SUMMARY OF
COMMENTS (June 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
environment/wel/main/commentator_detail.cfm?n_cmt_id=503.
160. Umwelthaftungsgesetz vom 10 Dez. 1990 [Environmental Liability Act of Dec. 10,
1990], GERMAN FEDERAL GAZETTE, Part I, 2634 [hereinafter Environmental Liability Act
(Germany)].
161. Environmental Liability Act (Germany) § 20.
162. Clarke, supra note 45, at 32.
RICHARDSON.DOC 09/04/02  1:50 PM
322 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 12:293
Finland have established pollution cleanup funds, financed by com-
pulsory insurance payments for high-risk operations, to finance the
restoration of orphaned sites and compensate personal injury and
property damage where the liable party is unknown or insolvent.163 At
a regional level, there is already provision for mandatory insurance in
the 1993 Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment,164 and the
E.U. Regulation of 1993 regarding the monitoring and supervision of
shipments of waste also mandates insurance or other financial secu-
rity to cover any damage.165
While existing practice does not suggest that mandatory envi-
ronmental liability insurance is a well developed feature of environ-
mental law systems, general financial responsibility requirements are
generally well accepted and stakeholders’ resistance to mandatory in-
surance can perhaps be understood partly in terms of unfamiliarity
with this option. Before concluding, it is appropriate to examine
briefly a few other insurance-type options.
V.  OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE OPTIONS
A. First-party Victim Insurance
An alternative to third-party liability insurance is first-party in-
surance, already widely used in industrial countries in relation to per-
sonal injury compensation in healthcare and social security contexts.
First-party insurance involves compensation being awarded directly
by the insurer to the victim. The demand for first-party insurance will
increase where fault-based liability standards prevail since the injurer
will in theory take due care to avoid having to pay compensation to
harmed third parties.166 By contrast, victims will be compensated fully
under a strict liability standard, and so risk adverse injurers will seek
third-party liability insurance to meet their expected liabilities. A few
commentators see first-party victim insurance as a superior alterna-
tive to mandatory liability insurance in a number of contexts.167
163. In the case of Sweden, see Swedish Environmental Code 1999, ch. 33.  For Finland, see
Environmental Insurance Act 1999 as cited in Pekka Vihervuori, Finland, in 1 YEARBOOK OF
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 477, 481 (H. Somsen et al. eds., 2000).
164. Art. 12, 32 I.L.M. 480 (1993).
165. Council Regulation 259/93 of 1 Feb. 1993 on the Supervision and Control of Shipments
of Waste within, into and out of the European Community, art. 27(1), 1993 O.J. (L 30) 1.
166. FAURE & GRIMEAUD, supra note 105, at 136.
167. Shavell, supra note 100.
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The advantages of first-party insurance are that the insured vic-
tim can arrange insurance protection that perfectly matches their de-
sired extent of insurance coverage. Because insurers can more readily
obtain information regarding victims’ risk profiles and monitor their
risk exposure, insurers are able to achieve better risk differentiation
and so control the problem of adverse selection.168 With third-party
insurance, the definition of risk is harder because the insured is seek-
ing coverage against liability of the insured to another, compared with
first-party insurance where the insured is seeking coverage against
loss or damage sustained by itself.169 Third-party liability insurance
also poses greater uncertainties to insurers because of changing judi-
cial interpretations of applicable liability standards.
Concerning environmental damage, however, there appear to be
two major drawbacks with first-party insurance. Firstly, many envi-
ronmental accidents may involve damage to biodiversity and other
ecosystem components for which there may be no individual harmed
party able or willing to assert losses. Secondly, even where private
victims are present, first-party insurance may be an inefficient means
of compensating victims of environmental damage.170 So often the
cheapest solution may be to remove the cause of the pollution, in-
stead of indefinitely compensating individual victims. One or a few
polluters can usually much more cheaply organize to undertake a
cleanup of contaminated land than a number of unrelated individual
victims facing higher transaction costs and less information about the
problem. Furthermore, because the polluting companies may also be
aware of contamination dangers well before they harm third parties,
it usually will be more efficient for the polluter to control the pollu-
tion before third-party injuries arise. It has also been suggested that
companies may be able to stem pollution risks through relatively in-
expensive improvements, such as adoption of new emission control
technologies. Overall, first-party insurance appears anathema to the
polluter pays principle and does not offer incentives for polluters to
change their behavior.171
There could, nevertheless, be advantages in devising insurance
products that combine first- and third-party coverage. Some commen-
tators regard the Dutch environmental damage insurance policy as
such an innovative approach that overcomes some of the potential
168. See generally Priest, supra note 60.
169. FAURE  & GRIMEAUD, supra note 105, at 172.
170. See Leiter, supra note 102, at 313-14.
171. Id.
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drawbacks of separate first-party and third-party insurance.172 The
Dutch Insurance Association offers integrated coverage for soil and
water pollution that is sudden or gradual, which occurs both on and
from the insured site. Coverage is provided whether or not the in-
sured is liable for the pollution, with the trigger being the insurance
policy. Protection is offered to both the insured’s site and harmed
third parties. Because coverage does not flow from tort law, compen-
sation to victims can be quicker with reduced transaction costs. Al-
though the insured remains in theory fully liable, because third-party
beneficiaries of the policy can claim directly against insurers there is
less need to resort to the courts to obtain relief unless the insured’s
level of coverage is inadequate to meet claims. Although the policy is
not compulsory in the Netherlands, industry is reported to have
shown greater interest in it than traditional liability insurance op-
tions.173
B. Mutual and Self-insurance Schemes
Other options are mutual and self-insurance schemes. Self-
insurance schemes have recently grown at the expense of the insur-
ance market controlled by commercial liability insurers. Following
the United States’s insurance litigation explosion, escalating premi-
ums and coverage unavailability contributed to an increasing prefer-
ence for insuring with a “captive” insurer owned by the policyholder
to provide insurance to the owner alone.174 In effect, captives are not
true insurance as there is no risk spreading and instead they amount
to a mechanism for building up reserves for future contingencies us-
ing the tax advantages offered by captives.175 There is also no guaran-
tee that the reserves would be quarantined for meeting future envi-
ronmental liabilities. Self-insurance as such is considered an
inadequate basis for meeting FRRs as the reserve “will simply be
considered as one of the assets of the company” open to the claims of
creditors.176 Self-insurance is also unviable for SMEs lacking substan-
tial financial resources.
172. See FAURE & GRIMEAUD, supra note 105, at 184-88.
173. Id. at 185.
174. See PAUL A. BAWCUTT, CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES, ESTABLISHMENT,
OPERATION AND MANAGEMENT 3-4, 8-13 (1991); see also Robert D. Hogue, The Growing
Captive Business, INS. ADVOC., Jul. 17, 1999, at 38 (discussing relevant developments in the
U.S.); Do-it-Yourself Insurance, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 1994, at 19 (focusing on a few European
companies).
175. FAURE & GRIMEAUD, supra note 105, at 177.
176. Id.
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Alternatively, polluters may seek to collectively organize cover-
age through niche “risk retention groups” that function like mutual
insurers.177 Their communal structure and self-interest in minimizing
risks makes mutual insurance associations relevant to safety and envi-
ronmental regulation.178 The mutuality means that the insurance paid
by one member depends on the claims by all other members of the
groups. Because of this relationship, it has been argued that mutual
insurance clubs create a form of “moral economy amongst members”
whereby “it is in the interests of each member for all other members’
claims to be as low as possible.”179 Further, mutual insurance ar-
rangements have the advantage that profits from the mutual fund
flow back to the insured participants, and reduced claims feed re-
duced premiums. Under a mandatory financial responsibility regime,
government-approved mutual insurance pools could be an alternative
to commercial insurance.
The most advanced mutual insurance pools exist in the ship-
ping180 and nuclear power sectors.181 The shipping industry, for exam-
ple, is subject to extensive compulsory insurance requirements princi-
pally in relation to the risk of oil spills.182 The vast majority of the
world’s shipping by tonnage is controlled by mutual nonprofit ar-
rangements whereby ship owners pool their third-party liabilities.
Ship owners obtain liability insurance through their membership in
the so-called Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs.183 The P&I clubs
have sought to minimize problems of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion through recruitment of managers to control admission, set pre-
miums to reflect the risks of each member and handle claims. Further,
to reduce the scope for substandard ship owners to transfer freely be-
tween clubs in the search for lower premiums and softer standards,
the major P&I groups have forged a mutual structure known as the
177. Michelle Baurkot, Into the Pool, BEST’S REV.: PROP./CASUALTY INS. ED., Apr. 1998,
at 47.
178. See Paul Bennett, Mutuality at a Distance? Risk and Regulation in Marine Insurance
Clubs, 32 ENV’T & PLANNING 147 (2000).
179. Paul Bennett, Mutual Risk: P&I Insurance Clubs and Maritime Safety and Environ-
mental Performance, 25 MARINE POL’Y 13, 15 (2001).
180. See Joseph E. M. Hughes, Safety at Sea: A P&I Perspective, RISK MGMT., May 1997, at
45 (brief history of P&I insurance clubs).
181. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NUCLEAR
POWER IN COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 32 (2000).
182. See, e.g., Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 STAT. 484 (U.S.); Mer-
chant Shipping Act 1995, §§ 163-64 (1997) (U.K.).
183. T.G. Coghlin, Protection and Indemnity Clubs, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L. Q. 403, 405
(1984).
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International Group of P&I Clubs, covering some 90 percent of ship
tonnage. The Group also offers a broader spread of risk so that large
claims can be satisfied.184 This institutional arrangement therefore en-
sures that rival clubs have strong reasons to be concerned about the
safety standards and performance of other clubs in the Group.
There are, however, weaknesses with the P&I club system, which
suggest that this approach may not always be a viable option to com-
pulsory environmental insurance. Because of international variations
in ship safety standards, Bennett argues that P&I premiums “may en-
courage the displacement of substandard ships to routes where the le-
gal risks are not so great” and where compensation payments are
lower because “crews employed on substandard contracts have fewer
rights.”185 Consequently, the P&I club system may actually encourage
inferior standards of shipping because substandard operators may be
rewarded with lower premiums.186 More generally, mutual insurance
pools may be unhelpful where enterprises are undercapitalized or po-
tentially insolvent. Potentially liable parties who are not sufficiently
solvent may be unable to gain entry to a risk retention group. Perhaps
the major disadvantage of such insurance pools is that the diversifica-
tion of the risk is restricted to the particular collection, whereas com-
mercial insurance can offer much greater specialization and diversifi-
cation, and, through this, reduced transaction costs.187 Insurance pools
can unravel where managers are unable to efficiently discriminate be-
tween the risks of members and price their contributions to the pool
accordingly.
Faure and Grimeaud suggest that risk insurance pools are likely
to be efficient choices only in relation to risks “so technical and com-
plicated that only the operators themselves can be judged able to
monitor the risk and to require preventive measures accordingly.”188
Mutual insurance pools are likely to be most advantageous when
commercial insurers are confronted with major new risks for which
they lack sufficient experience to evaluate the technical aspect of the
risk and when the evolution of such risks is uncertain both techno-
logically and in terms of liability law. In such circumstances, grouping
184. Bennett, supra note 179, at 17.
185. Id. at 18-19.
186. See Paul Bennett, Environmental Governance and Private Actors: Enrolling Insurers in
International Maritime Regulation, 19 POL. GEOGRAPHY 875, 889 (2000).
187. See Edwin Unsworth, Stern Warning Issued for P&I Clubs’ Future, BUS. INS., Mar. 4,
1996, at 56.
188. FAURE & GRIMEAUD, supra note 105, at 196.
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an entire market within a pool for a period gives time for devising a
suitable product and assembling the capacity required. Unlike typical
insurance pricing, mutual insurance pools can be based on an agree-
ment to share losses ex post, and so can overcome the need for ap-
propriate actuarial information ex ante.189
VI.  CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed how insurance markets can contribute
to effective environmental risk management, and suggested ways in
which some of the constraints to insurance can be overcome. In addi-
tion to stressing the importance of clarifying environmental liability
standards, this Article has identified benefits from mandating envi-
ronmental insurance. Risk aversion creates a natural demand for in-
surance, but its effect is dulled in the case of a judgment-proof enter-
prise. When an enterprise’s potential environmental liabilities exceed
its ability to pay for damages, there arises a disincentive to voluntarily
purchase full insurance. The result is incomplete environmental cost
internalization. Mandatory environmental insurance offers a way of
overcoming insolvency threats and meeting the cost internalization
demands of strict-liability based standards. The reinsurance sector
coupled with insurers’ exploitation of the capital markets through ca-
tastrophe bonds and similar financial instruments could give insur-
ance markets substantial resources to meet claims under mandatory
insurance regimes.
Implementation of a compulsory environmental insurance re-
gime is not without potential difficulties. The acceptability of legisla-
tive intervention will depend inter alia on the terms on which insur-
ance is made available, including the preventive measures required,
specification of the type of pollution and damage covered (e.g., grad-
ual and/or accidental pollution), methods of appraising environmental
risks; and the basis of coverage (e.g., claims-made or occurrence).190
There is also the problem of the status of existing polluting facilities
already associated with gradual pollution and historic contaminated
lands, which insurers would not wish to be associated with. If insurers
are unwilling to take on responsibilities as compulsory insurers, then
governments will need to provide financial inducements. Govern-
ments could exempt certain environmental liability policies from
premium taxes typically applied to insurance transactions. Further,
189. Id.
190. Lorvo, supra note 30, at 513-515.
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rather than blanket requirements for compulsory insurance, environ-
mental regulators should be flexible and able to judge whether insur-
ance or some other financial security should be required on an indi-
vidual basis taking into account characteristics of the firm, the
economic sector and environmental risks involved.
It is important to heed Clarke’s warning that insurance cannot be
equated with social security. He argues that it is a “misnomer” to as-
sume that by making insurance compulsory all victims can be com-
pensated and damaged environments repaired “without endangering
the public purse.”191 Because of inevitable limits to indemnity, de-
ductibles, conditions, exclusions, specific policy periods and triggers,
insurance does not amount to a guarantee that an insured’s losses will
be covered. Other policy instruments such as environmental taxes and
direct statutory controls will retain a place in environmental regula-
tory systems to influence corporate behavior. Moreover, there is ar-
guably a need for a complementary compensation fund to finance en-
vironmental restoration and compensate victims where the polluters
cannot be identified or sites abandoned by insolvent firms pose a
threat to ecological and public health.192 Proposals for public compen-
sation funds need to be carefully structured to ensure that they do not
discourage private cleanups nor undermine environmental law’s focus
on discouraging production of environmental harms and improper
disposal of waste. There is also the problem of determining who
should contribute to a compensation fund; to minimize violation of
the polluter pays principle, arguably compensation funds should be
financed from environmental taxes levied on relevant polluting indus-
tries according to the risks they pose.
Despite the uncertainties of the extent to which the insurance
market can function as an instrument of environmental governance, it
is a sector that will likely evolve in importance through its ability to
price environmental risks, encourage precautionary measures and
generate funds for environmental cleanup. In recent years, the re-
duced cost of coverage and lower premiums in most lines of environ-
mental insurance promise wider availability of insurance as coverage
becomes more affordable. Since the conditions of insuring environ-
mental risks are constantly changing in the light of improved scientific
understanding of hazards, accumulation of loss experience and
changes in liability rules, the precise relationship between insurance
191. Clarke, supra note 158, at 201.
192. See Hubert Bocken, Complementary Compensation Mechanisms: A General Environ-
mental Fund?, in INSURANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, supra note 107, at 425.
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and direct regulation will concomitantly change and will need to be
revisited.
